The border population of Jammu region stretching from Akhnur to Sambha faced the brunt of cross border firing by Pakistan from 1st to 10th October leading to heavy casualties on the Indian side. Approximately 70000 civil populace was affected, 30000 had to seek shelter in temporary camps, major damage was inflicted by Pakistani firing to private property in border villages on the Indian side. Cattle livestock was killed or injured in hundreds; city dwellers may not be sensitive to the fact that animal livestock are very precious to rural folk and their loss would have inflicted great anguish. The security and well-being of Indian citizens living in border villages was gravely violated. Interestingly while the IB Sector (International Boundary) of J&K stretching from Sambha to Akhnur was subject to fire by Pakistan Rangers, the LOC sector North and South of Pir Panjal lay largely silent and dormant. Everyone a mute witness to the battering that was being inflicted on innocent and helpless civil populace. Media was up and about as usual, BSF actions and retaliatory firing visuals were splashed all over the TV screens, and interviews of affected people were aired by all sundry channels. Finally, on higher instructions Indian artillery commenced engagements across LOC in areas South of Pir Panjal and stretching up to Sialkot sector on Pak border posts and infrastructure. The vehemence and intensity of Indian response was such, that border firing by Pakistan eased off and conciliatory statements were issued by Pak leadership.
The violent Indian response presumably came as a surprise to the Pakistani regime. While cross border firing has eased off for the moment, the pause may just be temporary till the Pakistanis re calibrate their options and resume targeting India in different forms. There is a pressing need therefore, to re-examine the effectiveness of our main border management force the BSF in light of threats likely to emerge.
The initial cadence of the BSF in this engagement was standard pattern retaliatory firing 'bullet for bullet-Bollywood style'. To a trained eye, the TV visuals of BSF in action indicate an inadequately trained force with poor weapon handling procedures. The 81mm mortar, which is a primary tool for retaliatory fire at BSF battalion level, can fire at a sustained rate of 12 rounds per minute out to a range of 5000 m. Effective mortar fire can be devastating. However, the mortar handling of BSF crews showed that they had little clue of mortar fire procedures. Their actions were hesitant and untrained. The weapon emplacements, construction of defences, siting of surveillance devices was ad hoc and not designed to put down sustained accurate destructive fire power and absorb the same as inflicted by the enemy. Their fundamental body language and fitness levels are that of a Police force rather than that of a Para Military force which would expected to be relevant in emergent operational conditions of 21st Century hybrid warfare. As per Wikipedia the BSF is a 2,40,000 man force organized in 187 battalions with more on the way. It has 20 artillery regiments equipped with 105 mm light field gun having an effective range of 17 Km. It has its own air wing with an assortment of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft as also a marine wing.
To put it in right perspective, a standard infantry division has nine infantry battalions. A Corps sized formation has three infantry divisions. 187 BSF battalions would imply a force equivalent to 20 infantry divisions and artillery regiments adequate to populate six artillery brigades. We are looking at a force that has almost as many infantry divisions equivalent that Indian Army has on the Western front albeit organized differently. For all that buck spent on the BSF there is no bang. The border populace continues to be hammered. However, on the other hand BSF video on you tube talk of a force carrying out heliborne operations and visuals that could very well be mistaken to be that of Indian Army in various operational conditions. See the video here .
Established in 1965 with significant army contribution, over time BSF has effectively distanced itself operationally and culturally from the Indian Army, while at the same time propagating a view that it is 'the first responder' in conflict situations and its size and equipment indicate that philosophy. So we have an ersatz army in the making. As well equipped as the Indian Army infantry backed up by field artillery but entirely lacking the leadership, training, and battle instinct of a regular army.
There are very few Indian Army ex-servicemen in BSF, both officers and JCOs/Other Ranks. The terms and conditions for ex-servicemen are harsh and humiliating wherein they are absorbed at ranks and grade inferior to that held while serving in the Army. There is no concept of Indian Army personnel going on deputation to BSF. On the other hand, Pakistan Rangers have a parallel induction system of Pakistan Army personnel into their force as also personnel who come on deputation. Commanding officers and key personnel of Pakistan Rangers battalions are from PA as is the DG who is a Major General appointed by GHQ Pakistan Army. Their operational capability is more akin to that of an Assam rifles battalion, which is a PMF under Indian Army.
Every year thousands of highly trained army personnel are retired as the terms and conditions of service in the army are very different from PMFs. Infantrymen, artillery gunners, signalers, engineers; all of who constitute a wealth of trained and skilled military manpower and could be assets to any PMF, are wasted. Half of Indian Army’s highly trained officers are superseded at fifteen years of service for the simple reason that the steep pyramidal structure of the army cannot absorb them. This is in sharp contrast to the service terms of other government services, PMFs included.
The next conflict would be very different from the previous ones. The dividing lines of peacetime and wartime will be diffused and opaque. The gen-next militant will morph into ISIL like clone and will require coordinated efforts of the State to tackle such threats. The Iraqi Army, Kurds and Syrians are having a tough time tackling ISIL. Once the Americans pull out of Afghanistan, the ability of the present Afghan regime and its army to stand up to Pakistan backed Taliban militants remains a question mark, till such time India as a major stake holder steps in along with other countries to shore up the regime. The next wave of militancy will be more virulent, violent and will aim at holding ground. Forces like BSF and CRPF who have been distancing themselves from Indian Army will suffer in combat. The anti-Naxal operations are a pointer, and the professional should pick up the signals.
It is time that Indian Armed forces personnel are integrated into these PMFs particularly the BSF. The DG and commanding officers should be from the armed forces so that the combat and operational capabilities of these forces are brought up to a level that they justify the expenditure that is being incurred on them.
The violent Indian response presumably came as a surprise to the Pakistani regime. While cross border firing has eased off for the moment, the pause may just be temporary till the Pakistanis re calibrate their options and resume targeting India in different forms. There is a pressing need therefore, to re-examine the effectiveness of our main border management force the BSF in light of threats likely to emerge.
The initial cadence of the BSF in this engagement was standard pattern retaliatory firing 'bullet for bullet-Bollywood style'. To a trained eye, the TV visuals of BSF in action indicate an inadequately trained force with poor weapon handling procedures. The 81mm mortar, which is a primary tool for retaliatory fire at BSF battalion level, can fire at a sustained rate of 12 rounds per minute out to a range of 5000 m. Effective mortar fire can be devastating. However, the mortar handling of BSF crews showed that they had little clue of mortar fire procedures. Their actions were hesitant and untrained. The weapon emplacements, construction of defences, siting of surveillance devices was ad hoc and not designed to put down sustained accurate destructive fire power and absorb the same as inflicted by the enemy. Their fundamental body language and fitness levels are that of a Police force rather than that of a Para Military force which would expected to be relevant in emergent operational conditions of 21st Century hybrid warfare. As per Wikipedia the BSF is a 2,40,000 man force organized in 187 battalions with more on the way. It has 20 artillery regiments equipped with 105 mm light field gun having an effective range of 17 Km. It has its own air wing with an assortment of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft as also a marine wing.
To put it in right perspective, a standard infantry division has nine infantry battalions. A Corps sized formation has three infantry divisions. 187 BSF battalions would imply a force equivalent to 20 infantry divisions and artillery regiments adequate to populate six artillery brigades. We are looking at a force that has almost as many infantry divisions equivalent that Indian Army has on the Western front albeit organized differently. For all that buck spent on the BSF there is no bang. The border populace continues to be hammered. However, on the other hand BSF video on you tube talk of a force carrying out heliborne operations and visuals that could very well be mistaken to be that of Indian Army in various operational conditions. See the video here .
Established in 1965 with significant army contribution, over time BSF has effectively distanced itself operationally and culturally from the Indian Army, while at the same time propagating a view that it is 'the first responder' in conflict situations and its size and equipment indicate that philosophy. So we have an ersatz army in the making. As well equipped as the Indian Army infantry backed up by field artillery but entirely lacking the leadership, training, and battle instinct of a regular army.
There are very few Indian Army ex-servicemen in BSF, both officers and JCOs/Other Ranks. The terms and conditions for ex-servicemen are harsh and humiliating wherein they are absorbed at ranks and grade inferior to that held while serving in the Army. There is no concept of Indian Army personnel going on deputation to BSF. On the other hand, Pakistan Rangers have a parallel induction system of Pakistan Army personnel into their force as also personnel who come on deputation. Commanding officers and key personnel of Pakistan Rangers battalions are from PA as is the DG who is a Major General appointed by GHQ Pakistan Army. Their operational capability is more akin to that of an Assam rifles battalion, which is a PMF under Indian Army.
Every year thousands of highly trained army personnel are retired as the terms and conditions of service in the army are very different from PMFs. Infantrymen, artillery gunners, signalers, engineers; all of who constitute a wealth of trained and skilled military manpower and could be assets to any PMF, are wasted. Half of Indian Army’s highly trained officers are superseded at fifteen years of service for the simple reason that the steep pyramidal structure of the army cannot absorb them. This is in sharp contrast to the service terms of other government services, PMFs included.
The next conflict would be very different from the previous ones. The dividing lines of peacetime and wartime will be diffused and opaque. The gen-next militant will morph into ISIL like clone and will require coordinated efforts of the State to tackle such threats. The Iraqi Army, Kurds and Syrians are having a tough time tackling ISIL. Once the Americans pull out of Afghanistan, the ability of the present Afghan regime and its army to stand up to Pakistan backed Taliban militants remains a question mark, till such time India as a major stake holder steps in along with other countries to shore up the regime. The next wave of militancy will be more virulent, violent and will aim at holding ground. Forces like BSF and CRPF who have been distancing themselves from Indian Army will suffer in combat. The anti-Naxal operations are a pointer, and the professional should pick up the signals.
It is time that Indian Armed forces personnel are integrated into these PMFs particularly the BSF. The DG and commanding officers should be from the armed forces so that the combat and operational capabilities of these forces are brought up to a level that they justify the expenditure that is being incurred on them.
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